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I.  New World Idealism 
      In spite of differing histories, Canada, Mexico and the U.S. share a common North 
American spirit whose instinct is profoundly post-European. Defining this spirit is no 
easy task if for no other reason than that the political formation of North America must 
still be regarded a work in progress.1 What unites its three principal societies 
philosophically is the legacy of the political idealism which originally inspired European 
settlement in the Americas. This idealism was not, of course, sketched against an 
historical tabula rasa; colonization took place in a time of profound division and 
confrontation: the 16th century European struggle between an emergent modernism and 
the forces of conservative Christian institutionalism - `Catholicism'.  
     Settlement in the New World was in large measure in response to this struggle. The 
inspiration that fired the imagination of the early colonists was not merely materialistic - 
the lure of new wealth or a desire to escape the persecutions of the time. It was also 
distinctly political: the prospect of beginning anew in pristine territories as providing the 
site and opportunity for a radical overcoming of the crisis brought on by the Reformation; 
the founding of an entirely new kind of polity specifically conceived as transcending the 
old order of a decaying Europe.  
      How the various colonial powers conceived and pursued this hope of the New World 
were accordingly profoundly different. Chiefly schooled in the Reformation, the English 
colonists saw America as an opportunity for religious freedom and the reinvention of 
society on individualist principles of moral and practical self-making. The Spanish 
arrived with an utterly contrary intent: America was to provide the site for a New Spain, a 
reconstruction of Roman Christendom on a grander, more permanent scale. French 
settlement would straddle these extremes; partly there is devotion to a New World 
independence, partly also a lingering loyalty to monarchial traditions.  
                                                
1 The 'twilight' of European political culture in his own time and the emigration of the Weltgeist to America 
and elsewhere, is the pivotal event animating Hegel's account of modern history: see Lectures on the 
Philosophy of World History, Pt. IV, 'The German World'; and Philosophy of Right Ss.358-360. 
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      In these differing motifs can be discerned the germ of North America's three main 
political societies, the United State, Mexico and Canada. While the English arrived 
lightly clad in a thoroughly internalized protestant-Christian heritage, the Spanish would 
transport the whole bag and baggage of renaissance Catholicism bodily across the ocean 
with a view to perfecting there what irreconcilable divisions had prevented in Europe. In 
barely a century they managed to transubstantiated the whole world of Counter-
Reformation Spain, tenet by tenet, institution by institution, stone by stone, to the 
Americas, imposing an aggressively neo-mediaeval culture, deliberately frozen in time, 
on the indigenous population. They thereby transfigured a whole diverse continent of 
peoples, bringing it under a single cultural regime: a 'Spanish America'2 which in 
essential ways was to endure virtually unaltered for three hundred years. Even today, 
visitors with a conventional view of early America as peopled by pioneers paddling 
canoes and living in hand-hewn houses are astounded to discover everywhere in Spanish 
America renaissance cities and towns, intact and entire, dating from the era of Guy, 
Cartier and the Mayflower.  
      This profound diversity of colonial legacies has made the experience of what it means 
to be North American something very different for Mexicans than for Americans or 
Canadians. In those latter countries, liberal individualism and pluralism have become 
second nature whereas, in spite of an equally strong sense of themselves as a New World 
people, three centuries of Spanish contra-modernism have fixed a decidedly anti-liberal 
bias in the Mexican soul. If citizens of the U.S. are notoriously unable to imagine there 
could be any other version of the American Dream than their own - how anyone else, 
indeed, is properly to be called `an American' - the truth is a Mexican version of that 
dream does exist, and, though less distinctly, a Canadian one too.3  
      Consideration of these differences in the forms of New World idealism as they have 
worked themselves out constitutionally in the histories of the three countries, might foster 
fuller insight into what North American freedom itself is, and in a sense wider than the 
typical U.S. stereotype allows. What follows is a brief and speculative attempt to 
compare the sense that political freedom has in the three principal cultures with the chief 
focus on the constitutional legacy of Mexico. As that legacy only begins, with NAFTA, 
to be somewhat appreciated in the rest of North America, a very brief sketch of it is 
herewith undertaken before returning to the main discussion.  
 
II. A Brief Constitutional History 
      To observe with historians that Mexico was conquered rather than colonized is more 
than to note that the Spanish, unlike the settlers farther north, encountered a vast 
                                                
2 The now more common term 'Latin' America was the 19th century brainchild of Louis-Napoléon who 
sought to promote a French-dominated world-imperial alliance of the French and Spanish ('Latin') peoples 
3 As the formal name of the Mexican state is `United States of Mexico', any reference to 'the United States' 
is rendered technically ambiguous. Hence the American habit of using `Americans' and 'America' to refer 
exclusively to themselves and their country has been acquiesced in throughout. 
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indigenous empire in their path. Beyond that contingency is the fact that their ruling 
ambition was not at all fueled by philosophical notions of founding a new kind of society 
but of extending and consolidating an already existing one. The ideal of a `New Spain' 
was directly and explicitly inspired by the anti-modernist politics of the Counter-
Reformation,4 and this meant that the whole approach of the Spanish to the new lands 
was from the first conquistadorial, not colonial.  
      The temptation to view the history of Mexico as following a pattern similar to the rest 
of North America must thus be resisted. Not only was the pre-colonial situation very 
different - `Mexico' as a highly organized aboriginal empire already existed - but early 
European settlement had a very different thrust and result, as did the subsequent drive to 
independence and revolution. Before Cortés, the Aztecs or Mexicas had established their 
violent militaristic hegemony over an immense cluster of Indian city-states. At a single 
stroke the Conquistadors brought this vast empire to ruin, imposing upon it another no 
less violent, the Vice-Royalty of New Spain. The 19th century movement to 
independence, in turn, sought to graft a modern state on the unyielding remnant of New 
Spain.  
      This succession of regimes followed a fatal logic of superimposition whereby one 
regime, though overmastering its predecessor, proves unable to assimilate it. Its political 
spirit broken, the vanquished culture survives nonetheless as a moribund fossil-bed into 
which the newly dominant one attempts to put down roots in vain. A dynamic of 
unsublimated repression has ensured that every Spanish attempt to quash the native 
cultures of Mexico has failed, as have revolutionary-modern attempts to exorcize the 
spectre of Spanish colonialism. Never able to draw upon a pre-existing popular spirit, 
government in Mexico has ever been possible only through a policy of sustained 
domination - the `institutionalization' of authoritarian power5 - and the history of Mexico 
has thus been a series of convulsions rather than a continuous unfolding. The Mexico of 
today is the product of three successive, discontinuous political cultures, Mexican, 
Spanish and Modern, grafted upon one another.6  
     As Mexico's pre-eminent political philosopher, Octavio Paz, has put it, the ruling 
principle of the Mexican polity is pyramidal, not historical: a crude layering of distinct 
legacies upon one another.7 Basal political instincts remain native, not only in that the 
main population remains mostly indio and a substantial residue of material aboriginal 
                                                
4 This is consistent with the views of Mexico's preeminent cultural historian, Octavio Paz, to be discussed 
later. Hegel also makes the point in Philosophy of World History p.166ff. 
5 The notorious proclivity for and acceptance of authoritarian power is no `genetic' Mexican trait, as some 
would claim, but belongs to a distinctive political legacy. Even later liberal and revolutionary governments, 
contrary to their express ideologies, could maintain themselves only as authoritarian regimes. 
6 See Octavio Paz, Sor Juana Inez de la Cruz, (tr. Peden, Cambridge, 1988) pp. 13-14. 
7 Paz finds in the pyramid a universal metaphor for Mexico: at once topographical, cultural, psychological, 
theological and political. The county rises up from the sea, plateau by plateau. Nature's pyramids (the 
ubiquitous mesas) are match by man-made ones everywhere dotting the plains. The pyramid also 
symbolizes the hierarchical divine-earthly order of indigenous nature-theology, mirrored in a political 
culture and everyday mentality equally rigid and hierarchical. See Octavio Paz, "Critique of the Pyramid" 
in The Other Mexico (New York, 1972). 
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culture survives, but in that the authoritarian mentality of the old Aztec order still 
dominates in public and private life.8 Contrary to a romanticism which depicts pre-
Columbian societies as instinctively harmonious and democratic, free of the 
aggressiveness which European invaders are supposed to have introduced, the actual 
temper of the Mayan and Mexican regimes was in fact extremely fierce. Order, security 
and prosperity were maintained through state-instituted violence and fear, including a 
commitment to constant warfare, ceremonial sacrifice and the cannibalizing of victims. 
Paz contrasts the theo-political outlook of the old Aztec nature-state with modern notions 
of polity:  
The Aztec theocratic dictum is: 'the god is us', not the democratic 'we the 
people are god'. Divinity is incarnate in society and imposes upon it 
inhuman tasks, such as human sacrifice. The 'Aztec peace' is the absolute 
converse of democracy.9  
     Such a cosmo-theological view of the foundations of community is, Paz believes, the 
distinctive trait, not only of the ancient Nahuas and Mexicas, but of all American Indians. 
Its fundamental metaphor is autocracy, not democracy; hierarchy, not community; the 
pyramid, not the level playing field. From it springs a fascination with power in all its 
forms still current and strong among Mexicans, who generally accept its abuses as the 
inevitable price of maintaining public unity, security and prosperity. Contemporary 
Mexican pundits regularly cite this persistent national obsession with power, and passive 
acquiescence before it, as the most formidable of obstacles to the emergence of true 
democratic culture in that country.  
     In the great Counter-Reformational struggle against nascent modernity, Spain had 
become the principal defender of the old order, perceiving as its sacred mission the 
rejuvenation of Roman Christendom, to be led by a coalition of monarchy and clergy. In 
1521, the year Luther was called to account before the Diet of Worms, Hernandez Cortés 
with but a few hundred soldiers defeated a Mexican standing army among the largest in 
existence at the time.10 Confronting him was no mere tribal coalition, but the legions of a 
vast, unified and centrally administered empire considerably larger than most European 
states at the time and whose fabulous capital, Tenochtítlan, was the fourth largest city in 
the world. Upon the carcass of this vanquished empire Cortés erected a regime no less 
fiercely aristocratic, reenforced by an ascetic religiosity no less fanatical than that of the 
blood-soaked Aztec priests.  
                                                
8 A weakness for rule by caudillo, the authoritarian strongman, seems indelible in the Mexican character. 
`Caciqueism' is a term routinely employed by Mexican pundits to describe this notorious Mexican 
susceptibility, the `caciques' being the elite class of warrior chiefs who formed the Aztec emperor's 
mainstay. 
9 Other Mexico, p. 305. The Aztecs thought the survival of their state depended on ensuring the 
continuation of the current cosmic era, the rule of the `fifth sun'. Success or failure of their military 
enterprises demanded daily ritual feeding, by human sacrifice, of "the insatiable appetite of this solar-
political divinity". 
10 The classical account is that of a contemporary chronicler, Bernal Diaz, an officer in Cortés' tiny army: 
The Conquest of New Spain (London, Penguin, 1963). 
JACKSON: MEXICAN FREEDOM: THE IDEAL OF THE INDIGENOUS STATE 
 
 193 
     Carried out with brutal resolve and in astonishingly short order, the Hispanification of 
Mexico was an abrupt displacement of a pagan nature-theocracy by a Christian feudalism 
no less implacably authoritarian, hierarchical and superstitious. Far from seeking to 
redeem the culture they had overwhelmed, the Spanish set out to suppress it with an 
infamous zealous cruelty. Reduced to spiritual and political serfdom,11 the Mexicans and 
their culture were eclipsed; shedding no light on each other, the two cultures endured in a 
mutually calamitous master-slave relationship for almost four centuries.  
     The ideals which created New England and New Spain were thus more than different; 
they were in some ways antithetical. Each sought to incarnate and complete in the 
Americas a new kind of political society that would embody the ideal outcome of the 
great conflict dividing Europe, as seen from one side or the other. Thus the one would 
seek to found a brave new world of enlightened individualism, the other a renewed 
Christendom based on neo-medieval orthodoxy. Stretching from Florida to California and 
Nevada to Guatemala, the empire of New Spain dwarfed the northern colonies in every 
respect. Within decades Spain was literally reconstituted in America; its art, its 
architecture, its feudalism, its monarchy, its holy orders, its ecclesiastical hierarchy, its 
theology-dominated universities, its inquisition. An imperial viceregal government 
pursued policies intent upon nullifying every tendency toward moral, social or 
intellectual change - toward `modernity'. It would instead deliberately establish a rigid 
Christian-theocratic order of life perpetuated with a thoroughness consistent with the 
declared belief that the Christian millennium had already arrived and had rendered all 
further history superfluous.  
     This is how Paz describes the spiritual standpoint of this remarkable project:  
Criticism hardly existed in this closed and satisfied world. The principles 
that ruled society were immutable and untouchable. Spain no longer 
invented or discovered; she extended her rule, defended herself, enjoyed 
herself. She did not want to change; she wanted to endure... The colonial 
world was a projection of society that had already grown mature and 
stable in Europe. New Spain did not seek or invent; it applied and 
adapted...the `grandeur of Mexico' was that of an immobile sun, a 
premature noonday that no longer had anything to conquer except its own 
decay...  
Religious speculation had ended centuries before. Doctrine had been 
established and an attempt was made to live up to it.... The decadence of 
European Catholicism coincided with its apogee in Spanish America: it 
spread out over new lands at the very moment it had ceased to be creative. 
The fervour...of Mexican religious feeling contrasts with the poverty of its 
creations... We [Mexicans] do not have a great religious poetry, just as we 
                                                
11 Only later did the Jesuits pursue a policy of reconciliation of sorts, by forcing upon native mythology the 
interpretation of it as a form of primitive or pre-Christian Christianity. They were thus largely responsible 
for the peculiar amalgam which is conventional Mexican Catholicism. 
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do not have an original philosophy nor a single important mystic or 
reformer.12  
     For three hundred years a colonial priesthood fastidiously maintained total censorship 
of the scientific, philosophical and political literature of modernity. Sor Juana Inez de la 
Cruz, the most celebrated Spanish-American poet and scholar at the close of the 17th 
century, betrays in her own writings or in the records of her vast library not a sign of even 
the most cursory acquaintance with the ideas of Descartes, Newton or Gassendi, much 
less of her actual contemporaries, Locke and Leibniz. For her and for her generation, 
intellectual history was brought to an abrupt halt with Aquinas and Suárez. In Paz' 
account:  
New Spain was a society oriented toward opposing modernity, not 
achieving it... The Counter-Reformation presented itself as an answer to 
Protestantism and as a moral and intellectual renewal of the Catholic 
Church. Its not inconsiderable first fruits were sublime works of poetry, 
painting, music, sculpture, architecture... but based on its very 
suppositions, the movement was destined to ossify.  
If any society has merited the designation `closed society'...[it] was the 
Spanish empire. Defensive by nature, the monarchy and clergy 
constructed walls, sealed windows, and closed all doors with a double 
chain and padlock... The intellectual history of orthodoxies -- whether of 
the Counter-Reformation in Spain or of Marxism-Leninism in Russia -- is 
the history of the mummification of learning.13  
     This New-Spanish legacy has left its indelible mark upon Mexico's cultural and 
political personality. The magnificent architectural, ethical and linguistic residue of that 
regime is still what chiefly charms and amazes the visitor to Mexico. The same legacy 
has also bred a fixed and abiding distrust of modernity, its intellectual outlook and its 
social principles. Wholly drawn to modernity in one way, the strongest prejudice 
nonetheless remains among Mexicans that there is something fundamentally corrupt, 
perhaps too `protestant', in the individualistic opportunism of American society. Nor did 
their own revolution do much to alter the traditional Aztec-Spanish taste for autocracy 
and hierarchy; "there is a bridge" writes Paz, "that reaches from tlatoani [chief] to 
viceroy and from viceroy to president".14  
     Independence from Spain in 1821 did little to alter the old semi-feudal order. The 
criolli - the Spanish-descended but local-born landowners and priests - simply wrested 
the role of ruling class from the peninsular governors. The Vice-Royalty of New Spain 
became the new Empire of Mexico, ruled by a series of creole generals, Santa Anna 
perhaps the most notorious. But continuing infiltration of American settlers into the 
Empire's northern provinces in the 1840's led to war and an invasion of Mexico City (the 
                                                
12 Octavio Paz, Labyrinth of Solitude (New York, Grove, 1985) p.104. 
13 Paz, Sor Juana Inez de la Cruz p.259. 
14 Other Mexico, p. 324. 
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`halls of Montezuma') by U.S. Marines. The Americans subsequently annexed almost 
half of Mexico's territories, an episode Mexicans still consider the most heinous and 
humiliating in the whole of their history.  
     A reform movement under Benito Juárez eventually sought to supplant the imperial 
order with an American-style constitutional state, but in the absence of a substantial 
indigenous middle class the liberal regime proved unstable and by the 1880's it 
degenerated into a dictatorship of the capitalist elite under Porfirio Díaz15. The country 
languished for thirty years under a capitalist feudalism dominated by foreign interests and 
sustained by tyrannical state police. Thus even liberalism, paradoxically, wanting for 
popular support, had ultimately to be imposed and sustained by force - to be 
`institutionalized'.16 The revolutionary overthrow of Diaz in 1910 is conventionally seen 
as the true commencement of the modern Mexican state. The country was plunged into 
another twenty years of continuous violence and chaos as military and guerrilla 
strongmen - Carranza, Zapata, Pancho Villa -- fought for dominance. Marxism and 
Fascism also wrestled to capture the popular imagination, but what eventually prevailed 
was a military dictatorship of generally socialist cast which, in 1929, established the one-
party system that is still in power. For almost 70 years now this system has maintained 
exclusive, uninterrupted power through a Mussolini-style incorporation of social 
institutions into a monolithic, all-powerful party organization, ruling by graft, 
intimidation and favoritism, headed up by a president-dictator who after six years gets to 
choose his own successor.  
     The party's name,`Party of the Institutional Revolution' (PRI), is instructive. It 
signifies that in Mexico even government by the people still cannot count on any pre-
existing political sentiment and thus can only maintain power through state coercion. 
Though other parties are permitted, and of late have gained much ground, they have been 
traditionally obliged to play the role of mere window-dressing in a parody on democracy. 
The collective memory of twenty years of general civil mayhem and revolutionary war 
early in the century, together with a deep-rooted belief in the inevitability of authoritarian 
power, sustains public toleration of the system. The current Mexican state thus runs true 
to form: if the Aztec caciques ruled by ritual public violence, the colonial masters by 
spiritual and political repression and liberalism by corruption into capitalist dictatorship, 
so too the Mexican revolution has been `institutionalized' as the rule of an all-powerful 
political class maintaining absolute power through systematic intimidation and rigged 
elections.  
     This culture of institutionalized revolution everywhere prevails. A distinctly 
propagandistic revolutionary history of Mexico is standard fare in the schools. The 
divinized names and images of the main heroes and events of independence and 
revolution dominate squares, buildings, streets and the everyday calendar of public 
festivals. This wholesale romanticization of Mexican history typically tells how Spanish 
                                                
15 Díaz declared `Positivism' - a mélange of Compte, Mill, Spencer and Darwin - official state philosophy, 
seeking thereby to satisfy the Mexican penchant for fusing spiritual with political categories. The Aztec 
cosmo-political mythology passes through Spanish-Christian theocracy into liberal-secularist ideology. 
16 See note 5, above. 
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atrocity had wrested from the people their ancient polity, frequently depicted as a sort of 
humanized Aztec or pre-Aztec Eden; how independence was finally achieved but 
immediately corrupted again by the Americans and other foreign capitalists; how the 
people's revolution has begun the process of winning it back. The main perpetrator of this 
nationalist mythology, as critics like Castañeda, Fuente and Paz have pointed out, is the 
PRI itself, whose typical rhetoric is openly aimed at justifying an exclusive hold on 
power in the name of its sacred mission of completing the revolution and restoring the 
authentic Mexican popular polity as so depicted. The most compelling fact of 
contemporary political life in Mexico is precisely a mounting awareness that this 
revolutionary mission itself, and the party which represents itself as its agent and 
guardian, have in turn been corrupted, and that the time has come to move beyond it, 
though in which direction remains unclear.  
 
III. Three Political Cultures  
America  
     The political cultures of the three North American states express historically differing 
forms of a common North American commitment to a free society. Americans ever have 
Individuality in view: in their political language, `universality' means the uniform 
opportunity for self-made, self-active individuals collectively to seek emancipation from 
nature through technical enterprise and from history through a melt-down of differences 
in an all-leveling competition. Mexican idealism lies at the other extreme; more 
communalist than individualist, nationalistic than democratic, it is aesthetically attached 
to the vision of authentic, indigenous popular culture; universality in the sense of 
rootedness in a common immediacy of earth, place, family and tradition. The Canadian 
ideal lies somewhere between these extremes: a post-colonial confederacy, it clings to the 
forms of the old nation-state. Part America and part Europe, it counts itself a modern 
democracy but such as would be tolerant of and conserve the diverse cultural traditions of 
its constituent peoples, whether aboriginal, French-English, or new-immigrant. Such 
respect for cultural distinctness Canadians deem essential to what properly defines a 
universal, humane community.  
     This differing stress on individuality, indigenity or history should not however cloud 
the fact that each is nonetheless a variation on the one supreme North American political 
theme: the state seen as the foundation and mainstay of a universal human freedom. In 
this is entailed a commitment to the principle that the legitimacy of the state can no 
longer be founded on a merely national principle, that is, on the appeal to a political 
identity based on contingencies of nature, i.e. race, tribe or clan, or on vicissitudes of 
history, i.e. conquests, treaties or extant cultural legacies. In their origin, thrust and 
character, and in spite of a residual deference to the older language of nation and 
nationhood, the North American states are both in origin and in essence post-national 
states.  
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     To this notion of the state as legitimate only where founded in a universal freedom the 
Americans alone might well claim to be true; their founding declaration explicitly 
invokes enlightenment language to proclaim the inauguration of just such an polity. 
Americans interpret their freedom, however, in entirely pragmatic terms of individual 
initiative. The world is the universe of possible action; of opportunities for uninhibited 
individual enterprise and innovation, the meaning of this activity lying, not in some 
predetermined objective end, but just in action itself as the means by which individuality 
makes its truth manifest, by which freedom is made flesh. For Americans freedom is 
doing, not being; the right to self-redemptive self-making, not the expression of some 
communal identity or existential condition; in this sense again American freedom is 
profoundly post-European.17 The cardinal American sin: to accept the world as one finds 
it; the cardinal virtue: to transform it and make it one's own. `America' is not a collective 
national ideal for Americans but a reality enacted and reinvented each moment in the 
self-initiated dreams of individuals.  
     The characteristic ingenuity, confidence and inexhaustible productivity of Americans 
stem from a commonly-held belief that reality and value have their source nowhere else 
than in the individual consciousness and will. It is a certainty that determines their view 
of the essential human relation to nature and to history. The former is profoundly 
technocratic, for the certainty of freedom demands that nature no longer be viewed as an 
alien reality posing an immutable limit but as an infinite resource, open and available to 
all manner of constructive human enterprise: a frontier endlessly to be conquered and 
crossed. And the relation to history is profoundly revolutionary in the sense that freedom 
implies that the values of culture and history are subordinate to those of conscience; that 
time and habit are in any case constantly transformed and renewed through the present 
initiatives of individuals. The notion that some given of nature or history could provide a 
sufficient principle upon which to base ethical and political life is, to most Americans, 
anathema; a superstition that denies freedom itself and which only a resolute commitment 
to radical individuality can cleanse away.  
     Americans are accordingly never in doubt but that their own contractual democracy, 
determining all relations as relations among free individuals, is the standard by which all 
others are to be measured.18 Constrained by attachment to their national cultures, thus to a 
finite, existential view of their freedom, Europeans have trouble appreciating what 
                                                
17 American freedom expresses itself in a boundless enthusiasm for `busyness' for its own sake. "The 
American Will inhabits the sky-scraper...[its] ruling passion joy in business...making it greater and better 
organized, a mightier engine in the general life" (Santayana. in Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, 1982, 
p.60). The logic of pragmatism is associated with James, Dewey and others but quite another account of it 
appears in Hegel (Phenomenology of Spirit, C.[AA].c) under the heading: "Individuality that takes itself to 
be real in and for itself".  
Americans generally understand the `universality' of freedom as the unrestricted availability to all of the 
opportunities for individual self-making; a view which is correspondingly weak on the metaphysical and 
political dimensions of freedom: freedom as elemental human nature and as an objective political 
condition. 
18 American political philosophy has long been devoted, almost exclusively, to the defense of individualism 
in some form. Even what is now called communitarianism is really a variation on the liberal theme: its 
argument that reasonable individuals will voluntarily set limits to their freedom in the interest of a common 
welfare and culture does not really go much beyond the older moralistic liberalism of a Kant or a Mill. 
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appears to them as the uncultured egoism and crass materialism of Americans. As unfair 
as this caricature may be (Europeans being no strangers to either vulgarity or greed) 
American individualism does foster an extravagant delight with the externals of freedom; 
with individual fame and individual wealth, with the novel, the unusual, the uniquely 
venturesome, with showy displays of disdain for everything conventional.  
     But this powerfully practical, outward-turned orientation of American freedom has, 
over the long run, eaten away at its own inner, spiritual underpinnings. Detached from the 
puritan faith and enlightenment moralism which originally both inspired and disciplined 
it, the American pragmatic conscience has already lost much of its former capacity to 
discriminate between true autonomy and mere caprice. Correspondingly, the principal 
thrust of American democracy, the commitment to the unlimited creation of leisure, now 
finds itself increasingly challenged by the revolt of nature itself against the insults visited 
upon it by a rampant technocracy. The engines of their national dream thus somewhat 
faltering, Americans are being forced to come to terms with what is intrinsically self-
conflictual in it: the idea of an ultimate human conquest of nature, of an economy 
expanding ad infinitum, and of a post-historical culture that literally steps beyond time.19  
 
Canada  
     Mexico and Canada have long sustained a characteristically ambiguous relation to 
American freedom with its commitment to the universal sway of private interest and the 
assimilation of every difference under the one rubric of individual right. Like Europeans, 
they are forever damning this view of freedom while at the same time, as North 
Americans, drawn inexorably to it.20 They have long sought to define and develop 
different visions of what a free society requires though with much less sensational 
success. Technically independent since 1917 and 1982 respectively,21 both countries have 
struggled, and struggle still, toward a political stability which seeks in some other way to 
reconcile their respective aboriginal, colonial and revolutionary legacies. Canada did not 
follow the revolutionary route of constitutional contract; its founding resolve was defined 
precisely by the refusal to do so. Instead it was quite literally conferenced into existence 
through a series of treaties, resolutions and compacts, creating a `parliamentary' 
democracy intended to sublimate, but not disavow, the country's monarchic constitution, 
so to hold together various conflicting colonial traditions. However, the ambivalence 
inherent in this uncertain wedding of democratic monism with cultural pluralism has 
fueled endless, inconclusive wrangling over national unity, attempts to resolve which 
                                                
19 Richard Rorty (e.g. Consequences of Pragmatism, 1982) articulates this ironic or sceptical turn in 
American idealism with great clarity; he attempts a post-pragmatic pragmatism such as would both 
transcend the American Dream and at the same time conserve and continue it. 
20 A Canadian example of the horror of American pragmatism may be found in the works of George Grant, 
e.g., Lament for a Nation (1965) or Technology and Empire (1978). 
21 Canada gained limited self-government only in 1867, legislative autonomy in 1927 and gained full 
control of its constitution as late as 1982. Colonial dependency has thus been shed only gradually and its 
shadow still remains. As for Mexico, it is questionable how far its revolutionary-democratic constitution of 
1917 can be said to have succeeded; twenty years of chaotic civil strife was resolved in 1929 only by 
recourse to a military junta which unilaterally established the present virtual one-party regime. 
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have ever been frustrated by the recalcitrance of various regions and groups, principally 
the Aboriginal- and French-Canadians, concerned about safeguarding and advancing 
what is unique in their cultural life.  
     Recourse has been made more recently to the fashionable idea of Canada as a `multi-
cultural' state, in theory, one which would seek to empower any number of political sub-
cultures under a single liberal-democratic roof. But this has only resulted in a 
proliferation of `minorities', real or self-appointed, each claiming exclusive political 
rights within and against the state. The idea is a typically Canadian hybrid: liberalism 
fettered by nationalism, democracy circumscribed by history.22 Attempts in recent times 
to conference these ambiguities into submission in turn have failed; the repeated call for a 
truly universal polity, otherwise felt strongly by Canadians, is drowned out by the 
clamour of nations, clans, cults and genders all seeking special recognition like so many 
upstart tribes in a colonial empire. The Canadian system is indeed just this: a system of 
internalized colonialism, issuing in chronic national uncertainty and a residual colonial 
sense of an independence possessed only second-hand. On the fence between revolution 
and history, a Charter of Rights appended to a monarchial constitution, able to sustain its 
communitarian (read: post-colonial) values only by dint of its dependency on a very non-
communitarian American prosperity, Canadians continue to nurture a notion of 
themselves as a `kinder and gentler' people.  
     Canada's lingering colonial constitution has produced a stock national persona at once 
defensive and defiant, imitative and paranoiac. Canadians like to flatter themselves the 
good life they enjoy is directly the product of their own virtue and avoid giving credit to 
the heavy role American culture and enterprise play in their fortunes. Without a clear 
national thrust of their own, Canadians tend to languish in a kind of political impotence 
giving rise to a tendency to compensatory euphemism: indecision becomes a unique 
talent for compromise, reticent sovereignty an aptitude for peace-making, cultural 
indistinctness a tolerance for multi-cultural values etc. If therapeutic in its local 
application, this timorous rhetoric has little or no currency abroad, where Canadians tend 
generally to be viewed as a rather mild-mannered, less consequential sub-species of 
American. The image is one also shared by its near neighbours; not a few Americans and 
Mexicans are quite unsure where exactly Canada is, or what sort of people live there. The 
ruling impression is of an American satellite culture on the fringe of a mostly vacant 
northern wilderness.23  
                                                
22 In practice in Canada `multi-culturalism' focuses chiefly on aboriginal and to some extent immigrant 
claims to rights of cultural identity within the mainstream `Eurogenic' society. In its more enthusiastic 
expressions lies the irony that the very English and French legacies through which the concept of universal 
right was established and developed in North America are typically refused like recognition as 'legitimate' 
political cultures; indeed are denounced for an alleged dismal record of overt repression and expected to 
apologize for past sins of racism, ethnic discrimination and the cruel enforcement of alien 'western' values 
such as scientific medicine, court justice, Christian education, modernization and so forth. 
23 A recent painting in the Mexican tradition of political allegory expresses the common view in that 
country of North America under NAFTA. Central is a dominant President Clinton enthroned as master of 
the continent against a backdrop of American industrial opulence. At his feet in the lower foreground is 
former President Salinas, represented as an ant (his nickname), heading up the great ant-invasion of the 
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     But however idealistically inconsequential it may appear to the cynical, the belief that 
the state is humane only to the extent it respects and conserves the historical traditions of 
its constitutive peoples is nonetheless a profound one, sincerely ascribed to by Canadians 
as definitive of who they are as a people. The foundation of the state in freedom can be 
secure only where it attempts to incorporate and redeem the manifold expressions of 
freedom itself throughout the course of human experience, rather than simply override 
these differences as is the manner of radical democracies.24 This notion of the state as a 
liberal, comprehensive good order had all along found expression in Canada in its 
attachment to older European-monarchial institutions, though a strengthening will to a 
more authentic North American autonomy now renders this traditional colonial 
nationalism no longer acceptable. Canadians urgently seek a new way of reconciling 
Reason and History, of uniting many historical legacies in one universal life.  
Mexico  
     Mexicans have no less difficulty than Canadians articulating what it is that moves 
them politically. Their relation to their own history is a distinctly negative one, typically 
represented in tales of endless conquest and oppression and unrequited yearning for 
liberation. Paradoxically, they are far more profoundly attached than are other North 
Americans to their pre-liberal traditions; even their view of their own revolution fails to 
conform to conventional 20th century notions of what a post-historical, revolutionary 
millennium is supposed to be about. Neither individualist nor even socialist its thrust was 
somewhat to restore an original, popular community, perceived as ancient and lost but 
still latent.25  
     Mexican resistance to democracy is not at all due to an innate incapacity for it, as 
Americans often suppose; rather their very notion of popular polity is simply not Lockean 
or Rousseauesque at all - not a metaphysical contract between abstractly free individuals 
- but a vision of a timeless, Mexican peoplehood predating the tyrannies and vicissitudes 
of history, and as reluctant now in adapting to the politics of modernity as resistant earlier 
to the impositions of Aztecs or Spaniards. The yearning to return to an indigenous, 
tangible, communal life, to the earthy ethos of the pueblo,26 is a constant in the Mexican 
                                                
Mexican working poor. On the distant north horizon, posing before a pristine background of woods, water 
and other resources and stripped naked except for little boy's short pants and a fatuous smile, is the 
Canadian prime minister. 
24 The ultra-liberal disrespect for tradition may be seen as limiting true democracy. Chesterton, for one, 
speaks of tradition as "the democracy of the dead", which he describes as a much wider constituency than 
"the arrogant oligarchy of people who just happen at the moment to be walking around". 
25 Paz (Labyrinth of Solitude, pp.146-49, 175) distinguishes two main forms of the revolutionary ideal: one 
(the American, French and Communist revolutions are examples) would attempt to found an entirely new 
kind of humanist order beyond both nature and history; the other rather would seek to rehabilitate an 
`original' political condition which history is seen as having corrupted. Mexico's revolution entailed 
elements of both, but the latter version certainly predominated, an outlook clearly manifest in the well-
known revolutionary art from that era. 
26 The ordinary word means both `town' and `people', expressing an essentially populist vision which 
directly identifies the state with a particular people (Volk, peuple, pueblo), defined according to some 
characteristic of race, language, culture etc., in other words, a tribal principle. In modern times it has been 
JACKSON: MEXICAN FREEDOM: THE IDEAL OF THE INDIGENOUS STATE 
 
 201 
imagination, a nostalgia heard in every poem or song. It is Mexico's unique version of the 
American dream and it has bred a very different complex of political values and habits of 
mind. A profoundly aesthetic vision of community, it contrasts sharply with the liberal 
perspective of its northern neighbours.  
     Due to roots set in an ancient, once-flourishing indio society whose descendants still 
form the vast majority of the population and whose symbols, customs and outlook still 
form the baseline of everyday culture, attachment to the idea of an aboriginal, indigenous 
political community is far more entrenched in Mexico than in Canada, for example, 
where native peoples were originally more scattered and politically disunited and still 
today form only a small minority. As an essentially aesthetic notion, this appeal to 
aboriginality does not lend itself to conceptual or pragmatic articulation; Mexicans 
indeed tend to disdain such modes of comprehension. There is, as Paz points out, 
virtually no tradition of political philosophy in Mexico;27 its political visionaries and 
critics, even today, are not philosophers or economists so much as poets, novelists, 
muralists, sculptors, painters. The sources and symbols of Mexican patriotism are 
emotive, not intellectual; artistic, not doctrinal. To the extent political ideologies have 
currency in Mexican history they have always had the appearance of foreign growths, as 
if grafted artificially on a communal sentiment which itself is profoundly and sensuously 
self-absorbed and thus not easily modified.  
     Nor is this sentiment to be confused with the more intellectual and ideological 
`political anthropologism' promoted by academic defenders of native rights in Canada 
and elsewhere, who conjure idyllic images of uncorrupted native communities 
harmonious and complete in themselves.28 Upon peoples living in a pre-technical, pre-
political condition (though the fact is none ever do, or rarely wish to, or could for long) 
`aboriginal rights' are conferred and assigned absolute priority over all other rights that 
are based on history or reason, on the grounds they are immediate and intuitive, thus 
conferred directly by nature, as it were. It is the romance, as old as Plato's Republic, of 
those who, seeking a wholly uninhibited autonomy, flee civil society into a fiction of 
pristine, pre-political community. That it is a pure romance is clear on grounds both of 
reason and fact. If to be human is to be free and the impulse to freedom is thus universal, 
then society is and must be always and everywhere political, not natural, institutional, not 
                                                
associated with fascism and various milder forms of `ethnic nationalism' such as inspires the Quebec 
separatists. 
27 "We [Mexicans] have had no age of critical philosophy, no bourgeois revolution, no political democracy, 
no Kant, no Robispierre, no Hume, no Jefferson" Sor Juana, p.16. 
28 A world-recognized authority on pre-Columbian culture in his own right, Paz is warmly critical of the 
`cult of anthropology' in his own country whose shrine is Mexico City's famous Museum of Anthropology 
(Other Mexico, p.321ff). Its tendency to worshipful veneration of the ancient native cultures, with its 
incongruous Nietzchean vision of the natural freedom of the earth-community, has more to do with a 
contemporary desire to escape modernity than with historical fact. As for the actual violence, terror and 
general paucity associated with tribal life, the typical response is to deny such conditions ever existed, or 
where facts become undeniable (as in the recently exploded myth that the Mayans were an entirely peaceful 
people) to mark them as vices introduced by interlopers, particularly the Europeans. Paz, on the other hand, 
sees Mexican populism as having far more tragic roots. 
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spontaneous.29 Secondly, what is known about actual pre-historic societies suggests a 
scenario quite other than one of pristine social harmony. Far from promoting liberty, 
equality or the pursuit of happiness, aboriginal regimes in fact typically maintained a 
fastidious authority over every aspect and detail of common life. The Mayan and Aztec 
regimes were exemplary incarnations of this severe, elemental will to power; they 
sustained the civil order of the state with a notorious ferocity through elaborate, merciless 
public rituals whose specific aim was the conspicuous, symbolic ripping out the heart of 
rebellious individuality.  
     The appeal to the idea of an aboriginal, indigenous polity has really little to do with 
any actual craving to revert to a stone-age, hunting-and-gathering culture, a proposal 
absurd on its face. Its lies rather in the deeper intuition that the objective ethical order, the 
state, is no arbitrary contrivance, whether of power or contract, but something permanent 
and substantial, the real, ever-present embodiment of a people's will to community. It 
does no justice to this intuition of the `originality` of the state to represent it as a `state of 
nature', for on the contrary, the communal will has its source precisely in human freedom, 
not human nature. But if the very notion of a 'natural' freedom (Nietzsche speaks of will-
to-power as the `instinct to freedom') is a gross contradiction in terms, it is perfectly 
plausible nonetheless to refer to indigenous right if by that is meant the right of every 
people to a political life that is their own; the right to live in a state. So understood, 
indigenous right may indeed be said to take precedence over all others, not in a legal or 
historical sense, but so far as political community as such forms the unconditioned 
condition, the aboriginal context, within which alone rights and freedoms first become 
possible and can gain recognition.  
     Finally, indigenous right has little to do with questions of `who was here first', who is 
or isn't `native', or the rights of this or that tribe to this or that piece of geography. It is in 
limiting their arguments to this kind of literalism that native activists in Canada and the 
U.S. weaken their case and betray a certain philosophical naivety. Understood more 
essentially - that is to say conceptually, in terms of freedom - aboriginal right refers to the 
apprehension of the state, the political community, as primordial and permanent; a 
common ethical-cultural context always and already there and given, a life existentially 
lived and which grounds and encompasses all human doings; a mundane reality as 
tangible and as real as one's immediate family ties, the field one ploughs, the cycles of 
the sun and the seasons.30 From the typical perspective of the older tribal peoples political 
community is not a conjured contingency but an eternal power both grounding and 
comprehending all the petty actions and fortunes of individuals. In the old Aztec 
                                                
29 Hegel, for one, is adamant on this point (see Encyclopedia, s.482) as was Aristotle: man is a `political 
animal', that is, is defined in and by active participation in the institutional life of the ethical community, 
the state 
30 The aesthetic ideal of indigenous community is `pre-historic' in the sense it entails, as Paz points out, "a 
distinctively pre-linear view of time merging yesterday, today and tomorrow, as if every event were, like 
the rising of the sun, an eternal return of the same". The hierarchical and cyclical movement of Nature, not 
the linear course of History, provides the basic paradigm, which may somewhat explain why a progressive, 
future-oriented outlook does not come easily to the Mexican psyche, nor for that matter, does the everyday 
expectation of good government. 
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symbolism, the state is the sun in whose orbit all things come to life and pass away, and 
in whose rising and falling is the beginning and end of time itself.31  
     If America is in some sense the apotheosis of contractual society, Mexico is in many 
ways its antithesis. From Juárez to Zedillo, Mexicans have flirted with American-style 
liberal democracy even while declaring it repellent on its moral and metaphysical side. A 
sense of indigenous populism has ever inclined them to resist liberalism even while 
adapting it to their own ends. Americans have perennially misinterpreted this 
recalcitrance as a kind of genetic incapacity for freedom, a view Mexicans intensely 
resent as the epitome of gringo arrogance. If from an American-pragmatic perspective 
there is much that is airily romantic in the Mexican yearning for a utopia of their own, it 
is nonetheless just this tenacious national spirit that survived centuries of Aztec, Spanish 
and American domination and still resists today the new regime of globalizing neo-
liberals.32  
     The Mexican distrust of political individualism is not, as Americans suppose, rooted 
in socialism or backwardness. The spirit of the Mexican revolution was fueled, not so 
much by modernist doctrines as by the vision of rescuing a Mexican communal legacy 
from its usurpers, an outlook to which the much revered, ubiquitous murals of Mexico's 
celebrated revolutionary artists vividly attest. The antagonism of a Rivera or an Orozco to 
their country's perceived oppressors was directed, not just against the evil empires of 
history, but equally against the purveyors of 20th century capitalism, fascism, liberalism 
and socialism. Their heroes were not social technocrats like Lenin or Henry Ford but 
early independentists like Father Hidalgo or agrarian-pastoral reformers like Emilio 
Zapata or Pancho Villa. For Mexican intellectuals it is the Americans who are politically 
retrograde, their free-enterprise rhetoric seen as a mere mask for a constitutionalized 
greed. Raised to a view of themselves as of all things open and fair-minded, Americans 
are often taken aback to find themselves assimilated to an unflattering stereotype of the 
gringo as a duplicitous hypocrite, waving pretentious banners of freedom and virtue 
while robbing you blind.  
     Mexicans cultivate this suspicion of American freedom to an extreme bordering on 
paranoia. Their otherwise strong resolve to become active participants in a broader North 
American economic society is frequently inhibited by a habit of invoking a litany of past 
conflicts and disputes with the U.S. in which the latter is inevitably revealed as a 
                                                
31 The abrupt collapse of the formidable empire of the Aztecs before a handful of Europeans is one of 
history's great enigmas. Yet the record is clear that Montezuma and his priests were convinced the matter 
was quite out of their hands, the solar-political divinities having already forsaken their state and foreboded 
its doom. As its `time' was quite literally up, there was no longer any will to defend it. Cortés only provided 
the catalyst for a defeat which is as attributable to the fatalistic passivity with which the Aztecs viewed the 
fortunes of their state as it is to Spanish arms. The sudden, catastrophic collapse of other pre-Columbian 
civilizations, e.g. the Mayan, may be susceptible to a similar explanation. 
32 Political assassinations, regional rebellions and massive economic failures attest to spreading scepticism 
in Mexico concerning the neo-liberal policies of the `perfumados' - the clique of American-educated 
economists currently running the PRI. The popular issue is never what is the right or wrong way to 
Americanize, but how modernization might be carried out in a manner more consistent with Mexican rather 
than American ideals of community. 
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scheming, untrustworthy enemy. Like Canada, Mexico's post-independence struggle 
toward statehood did in fact take place in a context of confrontation with the Americans, 
from the expropriation of California and Texas and invasions of Veracruz and Mexico 
City in the mid-19th century to latter-day American collusion in assorted plots to 
assassinate presidents, support dictators and thwart reform. Mexican paranoia concerning 
`American intervention' is profound - Mexico City even boasts a state-run Museum of 
Intervention to document it - and a good deal of everyday patriotic lore centres around 
national figures whose claim to fame lies in acts of heroic defense of the Mexican state 
against the American invaders. American free enterprise has long been popularly viewed 
in Mexico as a renewed form of conquistadorial tyranny, threatening the destruction of 
their national sovereignty.33  
     In spite of the ascendency of an industrial elite who now control the ruling party, the 
popular spirit in Mexico remains strongly anti-liberal. What has sustained the PRI's seven 
decade-long hold on power is not its once socialist and now liberal rhetoric so much as its 
ability effectively to collaborate with American capitalism in practice while continuing to 
exploit popular anti-American paranoia at home. This has done little to `democratize' 
Mexico; instead, increased Americanization under NAFTA has produced new extremes 
of wealth and poverty, widespread technological devastation, and perpetuation of chronic 
Mexican political vices of bossism, violence, and corruption, turning much of 
contemporary Mexico into an ugly mélange of the worst elements of both cultures. Far 
from restoring and rejuvenating a uniquely indigenous Mexican community, government 
by PRI has for the most part only exploited this dream to reinstitute, in yet another form, 
an unfortunate legacy of political exploitation on the part of violent elites.  
 
IV. North American Freedom  
     The three North America states share a common development. There is first a 
continent inhabited by primeval peoples alternately warring and confederating under 
more or less developed tribal, cosmo-theocratic forms of political culture. This culture 
reaches its highest sophistication in the 15th century Aztec Empire. The Europeans then 
arrive on the scene, bringing North America into world history. They decisively wrest the 
political initiative from the aboriginal cultures, which suffer eclipse, subordination or 
decay, and establish their own New World experiments in revitalized Christian-
monarchic society. Finally in the 18th and 19th centuries there is the move toward 
independence from Europe, marking the foundation of the three present-day democratic 
federations.  
                                                
33 For an extensive summary of the manifold mutual biases which infect Mexican-American relations, see 
Pastor, R.A. and Castañeda, J. The Limits of Friendship, New York, 1969. An example of the extreme 
sensitivity of Mexicans to American intentions was the furore created in the '60's by a single U.S. light 
plane conducting cloud-seeding experiments over the Gulf in a year of massive crop failures due to 
drought. A huge national outcry was raised by both press and government seriously alleging a U.S. 
conspiracy to `steal Mexico's rain'. 
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     Each has passed, in a relatively brief time-span, through similar transformations from 
an aboriginal to a colonial to a revolutionary form of political culture, though in such a 
manner that one or the other of these forms tends to predominate or remain residual. The 
Americans embraced their revolutionary constitution with a fervour that entailed a 
corresponding summary repudiation of native and colonial roots. In Canada, where there 
has never been a revolution as such, a gradual shedding of colonial institutions has tended 
to conserve the residue of a number of somewhat disparate histories, so that what 
predominates is a democratic amalgam of regional and national traditions.34 What makes 
itself most strongly felt in Mexico, however, is the ever-present reality of an aboriginal 
heredity and popular culture. This powerful legacy has sustained a notorious ambivalence 
concerning both the Spanish-colonial past and the revolutionary passage into modernity, 
transitions that were both violent and notoriously inconclusive. The effects of this long 
legacy of instability alternating with authoritarian rule still dominates all aspects of 
political life in contemporary Mexico.  
     These differences in constitutional history help account not only for the peculiar 
flavour of public life in the three countries but also for their inability severally to realize 
fully all that may be contained in the concept of a free, universal polity, to which ideal all 
nonetheless severally subscribe. There is a certain incompleteness, a residual ideality, 
preventing them from actually becoming the kind of state they already purport to be. The 
political spirit in Mexico remains fettered to a tribal-aristocratic prejudice which tends to 
identify freedom with power, typically translated into the aggressive, autocratic power of 
an elite upon whom the welfare of the vast mass of the people is forced to depend - the 
Aztec tlatoani, the peninsular Spanish nobles, the revolutionary generals, and now the 
corrupt plutocrats of the PRI. Canada's colonial-monarchic constitution has long 
predisposed its citizenry to a passive relation to their state, a reliance on it as the benign 
and benevolent patron of their social and economic welfare which in fact has always 
depended on the energy and initiative of other dominant peoples, first the British, now the 
Americans. Finally, the American revolutionary-democratic view of society would enlist 
state institutions wholly and solely in the service of private enterprise on the assumption 
that what is necessary for the realization of a universal, productive polity is already there 
in the inexhaustible potential and inward moral sense of the individual; for Americans, 
accordingly, their state is a subjective affair, a shared pragmatic ideal, never attaining to 
stable, objective form.  
     There is no attempt here, of course, simplistically to suggest that the constitutions of 
the three North American states embody three quite distinct views of freedom or that 
each espouses and articulates one as exclusive against the others.35 The suggestion rather 
is that they represent differing, developing facets of one and the same New World vision 
                                                
34 . In Canada the debate over `distinct society' suffers from the ambiguity that while Quebec nationalists 
view political rights as primarily cultural-historical, native peoples regard them as indigenous and most 
other Canadians as rights of individuality as incorporated in the 1982 Charter. 
35 As it has been waggishly put, Canada was intended as a blend of French culture, American know-how 
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of the free society. Each incorporates a principle coequal to the others as essential to that 
vision, their respective constitutions roughly distinguished according to which of these 
principles has the ascendency: freedom as primordial communal condition, as the 
historical project of states, or as rooted in the moral will of self-conscious individuals.  
     There is no doubt each tendency, so far as it goes, represents a major truth about 
political freedom. The intrinsic right of peoples to political order, to a state that grounds 
and is comprehensive of the whole of their common life, is certainly fundamental to 
freedom, and the yearning to see this requirement satisfied might well describe the basic 
political passion of Mexicans. Yet freedom also requires that a merely instinctive sense of 
community be educated and disciplined through popular allegiance to objectively 
represented national ideals, to which historical sense of their community Canadians seem 
bound to cling. But for individuals to acquiesce fully, freely and self-consciously in the 
life of the state, it is above all required that they explicitly know the infinity of freedom 
as their very own essence, and then know the state as the reality of that freedom, a reality 
created and sustained by nothing else but their own actions.  
     It is not easy to imagine how these ideological nuances could be recognized - much 
less reconciled - in the course of everyday political and trade relations as they clearly 
entail fundamental political-philosophical differences upon which economic and such 
differences are merely consequential. But as one might expect closer relations in a post-
NAFTA era almost certainly to exacerbate these political differences themselves and 
increase general awareness of them, there is room for optimism that the internal logic 
obtaining among these constitutional tendencies might be brought more evidently to light, 
perhaps to disclose an essential interdependence that might indicate what the spirit of 
freedom that shaped North America has yet to accomplish here.  
 
